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THE FORGOTTEN PROPERTY RIGHT:
THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE AT HOME
STANDARD IN ASSERTIONS OF GENERAL PERSONAL
JURISDICTION OVER CORPORATIONS
By: Peter J. Kuylen†
ABSTRACT
With its move to the “at home” standard in Goodyear, Daimler, and BNSF,
the Supreme Court significantly restricted the exercise of general personal
jurisdiction over nonresident corporation defendants. This restriction offers
questionable actual benefits to corporate defendants, but its rigid focus on
defendant’s rights has impacted the ability of certain plaintiffs to bring a
cause of action against those defendants. Because the at home standard in-
fringes on this group of plaintiffs’ ability to assert their property right of
redress in violation of the Due Process Clauses of the Constitution (Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments), the Court should return to the previous
“continuous and systematic contacts” standard developed under Interna-
tional Shoe. Hundreds of articles have been written in the four years since
Daimler erased fifty years of general personal jurisdiction jurisprudence. But
because personal jurisdiction analysis is traditionally defendant focused,
there is little mention of the plaintiff’s property right in access to the courts
in that literature. Personal jurisdiction rules should protect a defendant’s in-
terests, but not to the total forfeiture of a plaintiff’s property right. Recog-
nizing the at home standard as a misstep would resolve this constitutional
conflict.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A single father from Illinois diligently saves for years to take his
two sons on a dream vacation to southern California. While spending
the day at the Six Flags theme park, one of the sons suffers serious
injuries in an accident. A hardworking but profoundly poor single
mother from Texas is ecstatic when her daughter obtains a full schol-
arship to the University of Alaska. While shopping at the Walmart
near campus for dormitory supplies, the mother is injured. What do
these unfortunate people share? The reality that under the at home
standard, the Supreme Court has for practical purposes deprived them
of their property right in judicial redress for their claims.
Civil procedure is the bridge—or barrier—between rights and the
ability to exercise those rights. The rules of civil procedure serve many
purposes, including managing the workload of courts, providing due
process for both defendants and plaintiffs, reducing uncertainty, and
ensuring a remedy for injuries.1 These contrasting, and sometimes
conflicting, considerations must balance policy objectives within the
constraints of the Constitution.
The concept of personal jurisdiction answers the critical question of
whether a court can demand that the parties resolve their dispute in
that particular court.2 In answering that question, courts have focused
on the determination of two rights: first, the right of a court to compel
defendants to appear; and second, a defendant’s right to due process
protections of life, liberty, and property.3 This Comment argues that
the Supreme Court’s recent decisions eroding general personal juris-
diction raise an important consideration that has not traditionally
been addressed in personal jurisdiction jurisprudence—the limits be-
yond which a plaintiff’s due process rights are violated when the de-
fendant is a corporation.
The Supreme Court has expanded and contracted its jurisprudence
on personal jurisdiction like an accordion. Initially, personal jurisdic-
tion was narrowly applied geographically;4 then it was broadened
under a theory of reasonableness;5 and recently, it has been narrowed
1. FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
2. See B. Travis Brown, Note, Salvaging General Jurisdiction: Satisfying Daimler
and Proposing a New Framework, 3 BELMONT L. REV. 187, 189 (2016).
3. Id.
4. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
5. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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again.6 This evolution in legal interpretation is not unprecedented; a
similar phenomenon exists in Commerce Clause jurisprudence. At
one time, jurisprudence was narrowly construed to channels of com-
merce.7 Later, the Court significantly broadened the reach of the
Commerce Clause when analyzing New Deal legislation.8 Recently,
the Court has begun to move back to a narrower construction.9 The
recent jurisprudence on the Commerce Clause arguably reflects
changes in society, particularly differing viewpoints on the role of the
Federal government.
The recent narrowing of general personal jurisdiction application to
only the states where the defendant is considered at home is at odds
with changes in society and the realities of how corporations operate.
The argument that personal jurisdiction should adapt to societal reali-
ties is not new.10 At the same time, the number of transnational com-
panies has grown more than 500% since 1970.11 Despite this reality,
the Court has not responded by adapting general personal jurisdiction
to reflect the times, but rather moved backwards towards what the
Court itself recognized was the outdated approach of Pennoyer v.
Neff.12
This Comment proceeds in three parts: first, a discussion of the his-
tory of personal jurisdiction, with an emphasis on what is now known
as “general personal jurisdiction;” second, a discussion of current Su-
preme Court jurisprudence on general personal jurisdiction and its re-
striction on certain plaintiffs from filing suit with no corresponding
benefit to defendants; and third, a discussion on how the at home stan-
dard is inconsistent with due process because it fails the strict scrutiny
applied to restrictions on fundamental rights.
II. HISTORY OF GENERAL PERSONAL JURISDICTION
A. Pennoyer and the Focus on Service of Process and Federalism
The seminal personal jurisdiction case, Pennoyer v. Neff in 1878,
established bright-line limits on a state court’s ability to reach beyond
6. See BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549 (2017).
7. Ann Schober, Note, United States v. Morrison 15 Years Later: How the Su-
preme Court’s Disjointed Adjudication of Commerce Clause Legislation Opens a Back
Door to Restoring Federal Civil Recourse for Certain Victims of Gender-Based Vio-
lence, 34 J.L. & COM. 161, 167 (2015).
8. Id. at 169.
9. Id. at 171.
10. See, e.g., R. D. Rees, Note, Plaintiff Due Process Rights in Assertions of Per-
sonal Jurisdiction, 78 N.Y.U.L. REV. 405, 433 (2003).
11. Jed Greer & Kavaljit Singh, A Brief History of Transnational Corporations,
GLOBAL POLICY FORUM, http://www.globalpolicy.org/empire/47068-a-brief-history-
of-transnational-corporations.html [https://perma.cc/G9FR-93A8] (last visited Oct.
12, 2018).
12. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293 (1980).
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its borders and compel a defendant to appear and defend a suit.13 Less
than ten years after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Court’s reasoning in Pennoyer focused on the sovereignty of states.14
However, the Court also addressed the issue of a defendant’s due pro-
cess rights and its role in defining jurisdictional rules.15 At the time of
Pennoyer, travel was still exotic, expensive, and rare.16 As such, most
disputes did not involve parties from different jurisdictions.17
In the original claim, an Oregon attorney sought unpaid fees from
Pennoyer, a resident of California.18 The attorney brought a claim
against Pennoyer in Oregon, on which he prevailed by default judg-
ment.19 As Pennoyer was not a resident of Oregon, service of process
by publication was allowed.20 The attorney then sought enforcement
of the judgment through the court-ordered sale of Pennoyer’s Oregon
property.21 The defendant purchased the plaintiff’s Oregon prop-
erty.22 Pennoyer later became aware that his property had been sold,
and brought action against the defendant. The relevant issue before
the Court was the validity of the Oregon court exercising personal
jurisdiction over Pennoyer in the original claim.23 The Court held that
on claims involving personal liability, the court could only obtain juris-
diction over a defendant “by service of process within the state, or his
voluntary appearance.”24
B. International Shoe and the Shift to Reasonableness
By 1945, the intervening decades brought the rise of industrialism,
railroads, automobiles, and large, multistate corporations.25 Cases in-
volving parties from different jurisdictions rapidly increased in fre-
quency.26 In addition, practical and definitional obstacles to
determining a corporation’s “presence” had arisen.27 Because “the
13. 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1878).
14. Id. at 722.
15. Id. at 733.
16. Wm. Grayson Lambert, The Necessary Narrowing of General Personal Juris-
diction, 100 MARQ. L. REV. 375, 382 (2016).
17. Id. at 382–383.
18. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 719.
19. Id. at 719-20.
20. Id. at 720.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 719.
23. Id. The Court explained that in the original action, because Pennoyer was not
served with process and did not appear, the judgment was not valid against him. Id. at
720. Therefore, the court-ordered sale of Pennoyer’s property—which Neff pur-
chased—was unauthorized. Id. Additionally, the Oregon court could not establish in
rem jurisdiction because Pennoyer’s property was not attached in the original action,
but only in relation to the enforcement action. Id.
24. Id. at 733.
25. Lambert, supra note 16, at 383.
26. Id.
27. Rees, supra note 10, at 420.
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corporate personality is a fiction, . . . its ‘presence’ . . . can be mani-
fested only by activities carried on in its behalf by those who are au-
thorized to act for it.”28 The nature and quality of those activities,
then, is the critical measure of whether a corporation is “present.”29
The Supreme Court responded in International Shoe v. Washington
with a new paradigm for personal jurisdiction. The Court reasoned
that the presence of a corporation could only be manifested by the
activities of the corporation’s agents within the forum.30 The Court
stated that continuous and systematic activities that also give rise to
the claim establish a corporation’s presence.31 By contrast, “casual
presence” or isolated activities that do not give rise to the claim “are
not enough” to establish personal jurisdiction.32 However, the Court
also stated that “some single or occasional acts,” depending on the
circumstances, “may be deemed sufficient to render the corporation
liable to suit.”33 Finally, the Court stated that a corporation’s continu-
ous and systematic activities could be “so substantial and of such a
nature” that presence could be established even when the claim was
unrelated to those contacts.34
The Court appeared to announce a fact-based inquiry in which the
more contacts a corporation had in a forum, the less important it be-
came for the claim to arise from those forum contacts.35 The Court
also provided two guideposts for claims arising from forum activi-
ties—what became specific personal jurisdiction—and one for claims
unrelated to forum activities—what became general personal jurisdic-
tion.36 The uncertainty of applying this new standard might have been
predicted when the International Shoe Court explained that “the crite-
ria by which we mark the boundary line between those activities
which justify the subjection of a corporation to suit, and those which
do not, cannot be simply mechanical or quantitative.”37
The factual scenario in International Shoe fits squarely within what
has become specific personal jurisdiction. The company was incorpo-
rated in Delaware and had its principal place of business in Missouri,
but employed around a dozen salesmen in Washington on a commis-
sion basis.38 The State of Washington sought to enforce the payment
of unemployment taxes by the company.39 The Court found that the
28. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
29. Id. at 319.
30. Id. at 316.
31. Id. at 317.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 318.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 319.
36. Cassandra Burke Robertson & Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, The Business of
Personal Jurisdiction, 67 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 775, 778 (2017).
37. Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 319.
38. Id. at 313.
39. Id. at 312.
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company’s activities were continuous and systematic, resulting in a
large volume of business.40 Furthermore, the company enjoyed the
“benefits and protection” of state law, including access to Washington
courts as a plaintiff.41 Most importantly, the claim arose from those in-
state activities.42 Hence, International Shoe’s activities in Washington
fit neatly within the Court’s definition of presence, and personal juris-
diction over the company was considered proper.43
Although International Shoe was a specific personal jurisdiction
case, in its holding the Court announced a dramatic departure from its
previous personal jurisdiction jurisprudence. In dicta, the Court stated
that jurisdiction may be considered proper based on a defendant’s
contact with a foreign forum even when those contacts did not give
rise to the controversy.44 It was a “well-established principle[ ] of pub-
lic law,” even at the time of Pennoyer, that a defendant could be sued
for any reason in its home state.45 What the dicta in International Shoe
has been understood to establish is that defendants could be sued be-
yond their home states, regardless of the situs of activities giving rise
to the claim, if the defendant’s contacts with the state were continuous
and systematic.46 The Court specifically declared that “there [are] in-
stances in which the continuous corporate operations within a state
[are] so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit against it on
causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those ac-
tivities.”47 “The clear focus in International Shoe was on fairness and
reasonableness.”48
C. The Rise of General Personal Jurisdiction
under International Shoe
Between 1945 and 2011, the Supreme Court decided only two cases
on general personal jurisdiction. The first was Perkins v. Benguet Con-
solidated Mining Co. in 1952. Echoing International Shoe, the Court
held that general personal jurisdiction would comport with due pro-
cess if the corporation’s activities in the forum were “sufficiently sub-
stantial and of such a nature” that jurisdiction was proper for claims
not arising from those activities.49 In Perkins, the company was head-
40. Id. at 320.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 318.
45. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1878).
46. Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 320 (holding International Shoe’s operations in
Washington were sufficient to reasonably require the company to defend itself in a
Washington court).
47. Id. at 318.
48. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 300 (1980) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting).
49. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 447 (1952).
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quartered and conducted its business in the Philippines. While the
Philippines was occupied during World War II, the company’s presi-
dent relocated to Ohio, where he conducted the “continuous and sys-
tematic supervision of the . . . activities of the company.”50 The
president kept files, held directors’ meetings, and supervised the cor-
poration’s activities in the Philippines.51 The Court found that, even
though the company was headquartered in the Philippines, the Ohio
activities were sufficient to allow the Ohio court to exercise personal
jurisdiction, consistent with due process, over claims arising from the
company’s activities outside Ohio.52
Perkins has come to be the paradigm case for general personal juris-
diction.53 In fact, it is the only time the Supreme Court has found the
activities of a nonresident corporation to satisfy the exercise of gen-
eral personal jurisdiction.54 However, the citation of Perkins by Fed-
eral courts has dramatically increased since the Goodyear decision in
2011 established the at home standard.55 But because the facts of Per-
kins essentially established that Ohio was the temporary principal
place of business, in practical terms this “exception” to the at home
definition of place of incorporation and principal place of business is
so narrow it is all but illusory.56
The second case was Helicopteros Nacionales De Colombia, S.A. v.
Hall (“Helicopteros”) in 1984. In Helicopteros, the defendant
(“Helicol”) was a corporation incorporated and with its principal
place of business in Colombia.57 The company contracted with a joint
venture based in Texas to provide transportation services in Peru.58
The plaintiffs represented the victims of a crash in Peru involving a
helicopter operated by Helicol.59 The plaintiffs—United States citi-
zens but not Texas residents—filed the action in Texas state court, but
the parties conceded that the claim was not related to Helicol’s con-
tacts with Texas, so the court could only exercise general personal ju-
risdiction.60 The record indicated that Helicol had several substantive
contacts with Texas: the chief executive negotiated the transportation
contract with the joint venture in Texas; Helicol periodically pur-
50. Id. at 448.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Robertson & Rhodes, supra note 36, at 778.
54. Brown, supra note 2, at 201.
55. A WestLaw search on Perkins’ headnote eleven reveals sixteen citations by
Federal courts in the fifty-nine years between Perkins and the Goodyear decision in
2011 and fifteen citations in the nearly seven years since Goodyear.
56. BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1561 (2017) (Sotomayor, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that limiting the exception to the Perkins
facts “is so narrow as to read the exception out of existence entirely”).
57. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 409 (1984).
58. Id. at 410.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 415–16.
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chased helicopters and equipment from a Texas company; and Helicol
employees periodically traveled to Texas for training.61
The Court found Helicol’s Texas contacts insufficient to “constitute
the kind of continuous and systematic general business contacts” pre-
sent in Perkins.62 The Court relied on its holding in Rosenberg Bros. v.
Curtis Brown Co. that “purchases and related trips, standing alone,
are not a sufficient basis” for exercising personal jurisdiction.63 The
Court held that, because Helicol’s Texas contacts were insufficient, the
exercise of general personal jurisdiction over Helicol by the Texas
court was inconsistent with due process.64 While the majority framed
the question as whether Helicol’s Texas contacts were “the kind of
continuous and systematic general business contacts the Court found
to exist in Perkins,”65 Justice Brennan argued eloquently in his dissent
that the Perkins holding did not establish that the facts in Perkins es-
tablished the minimum standard of continuous and systematic con-
tacts.66 However, the facts in Helicopteros, especially in light of
Rosenberg, would be unlikely to meet even a lower threshold for con-
tinuous and systematic contacts.
Beyond these two cases, the lower courts were left to develop the
concept of “general personal jurisdiction” without guidance.67 Al-
though no dominant test emerged,68 the lower courts focused on
whether the defendant’s forum contacts could reasonably be consid-
ered continuous, systematic, substantial, or some combination
thereof.69 Despite the lack of a bright-line rule, the lower courts devel-
oped a predictable application for most of the rest of the century.70 In
fact, law school civil procedure courses taught as settled law that gen-
eral personal jurisdiction over corporations was proper where busi-
ness activities in the forum were significant.71 As a result, corporations
could expect to be subject to general personal jurisdiction in any num-
ber of fora, up to and including all fifty states.72 “Under even the most
restrictive view of International Shoe, several States could have juris-
diction over a particular cause of action.”73
61. Id. at 416–18.
62. Id. at 416.
63. Id. at 417 (discussing Rosenberg Bros. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516
(1923)).
64. Id. at 418–19.
65. Id. at 416.
66. Id. at 421 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
67. Robertson & Rhodes, supra note 36, at 779.
68. Lambert, supra note 16, at 392.
69. Robertson & Rhodes, supra note 36, at 779.
70. Id. at 779–80.
71. Judy M. Cornett & Michael H. Hoffheimer, Good-Bye Significant Contacts:
General Personal Jurisdiction After Daimler AG v Bauman, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 101,
114–15 (2015).
72. Robertson & Rhodes, supra note 36, at 779.
73. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 301 (1980) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting).
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWR\5-3\TWR305.txt unknown Seq: 9 15-APR-19 14:26
2019] THE FORGOTTEN PROPERTY RIGHT 509
D. Goodyear and the At Home Concept
Beginning with its decision in Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations,
S.A. v. Brown in 2011, the Supreme Court signaled a move away from
a fact-intensive fairness approach to general personal jurisdiction in
favor of an imprecisely defined at home concept. While acknowledg-
ing that the exercise of personal jurisdiction requires compliance with
“traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice,”74 the Court
defined general personal jurisdiction as when a defendant’s “affilia-
tions with the State are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render
them essentially at home in the forum State.”75 The Court used a vari-
ety of phrases to explain the meaning of “essentially at home”: a place
equivalent to an individual’s domicile; a place where the corporation
is “fairly regarded as at home”; and the place of incorporation and
principal place of business.76 While at home is significantly narrower
than continuous and systematic contacts, the imprecise language used
to introduce this new standard left the new standard open to
interpretation.77
The claim in Goodyear arose from a bus accident in France, which
was caused by a tire manufactured by a Goodyear subsidiary in Tur-
key, that killed two children from North Carolina.78 Because the
events giving rise to the claim—the manufacture and sale of the tire
and the bus accident—all involved foreign defendants and occurred
outside the United States, there was no possibility of establishing spe-
cific personal jurisdiction.79 The North Carolina court held that plac-
ing the tire in the stream of commerce was a sufficient connection to
the forum to justify the exercise of general personal jurisdiction.80 In
support of this conclusion, the court found that the tire was manufac-
tured according to United States standards, bore markings required
for sale in the United States, and Goodyear “made no attempt to keep
these tires from reaching the North Carolina market.”81 However, the
Supreme Court rejected the North Carolina court’s general personal
jurisdiction analysis, explaining that the stream of commerce is a fac-
tor only applicable to establishing specific personal jurisdiction.82 The
Court noted that it previously held in Helicopteros that “mere
74. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 924 (citing Lea Brilmayer et al., A General Look at General Jurisdiction,
66 TEX. L. REV. 723, 728 (1988).
77. Lindsey D. Blanchard, Goodyear and Hertz: Reconciling Two Recent Supreme
Court Decisions, 44 MCGEORGE L. REV. 865, 875 (2013).
78. Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 918.
79. Id. at 919.
80. Id. at 922.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 927.
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWR\5-3\TWR305.txt unknown Seq: 10 15-APR-19 14:26
510 TEX. A&M J. PROP. L. [Vol. 5
purchases” were an insufficient basis for general personal jurisdiction
when those purchases did not give rise to the claim.83
Aside from the possibility that Goodyear might sell its tires in
North Carolina, the defendants in Goodyear arguably had no contact
with the forum state.84 The Supreme Court did not need to narrow
“continuous and systematic”—which courts had been applying to gen-
eral personal jurisdiction cases since International Shoe—to “essen-
tially at home” in order to decide the case. Even under a broad
interpretation of continuous and systematic, the facts in Goodyear
would fail to support the exercise of general personal jurisdiction.
E. Daimler, BNSF, and the Definition of At Home
In 2014, the Court again referenced the imprecise at home standard
in Daimler AG v. Bauman, and again stated that place of incorpora-
tion and principal place of business would satisfy the standard.85 In a
footnote, however, the Court described at home as “comparable to a
domestic enterprise in that State.”86 In another footnote the Court
repeated Goodyear, stating that it was not eliminating the possibility
that somewhere other than the place of incorporation or principal
place of business could meet the at home standard, again using Per-
kins as an example.87
In Daimler, the plaintiffs were Argentinian citizens alleging injury
in Argentina by the acts of Daimler’s Argentina subsidiary.88 Daimler
was incorporated and had its principal place of business in Germany.89
The plaintiffs sought to bring the German parent corporation into a
California court by imputing to it the activities of its United States
subsidiary, MBUSA.90 MBUSA was incorporated in Delaware and
had its principal place of business in New Jersey.91 Its activities in Cal-
ifornia included several facilities and a majority position in the Cali-
fornia luxury automobile market.92 The Court stated that even if it
assumed that MBUSA was at home in California, and further assumed
that MBUSA’s California contacts could be imputed to Daimler, the
exercise of general personal jurisdiction over Daimler in California
would still fail to comport with due process.93 The Court explained
that the Goodyear inquiry was not whether the corporation had con-
tinuous and systematic contacts with the forum, but rather whether
83. Id. at 929.
84. Id. (“petitioners are in no sense at home in North Carolina”).
85. 134 S. Ct. 746, 760 (2014).
86. Id. at 758 n.11.
87. Id. at 761 n.19.
88. Id. at 750–51.
89. Id. at 751.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 752.
93. Id. at 760.
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the forum contacts were so continuous and systematic that they ren-
dered the corporation at home in the forum.94
The Court also stated that evaluating general personal jurisdiction
“calls for an appraisal of a corporation’s activities in their entirety,
nationwide and worldwide.”95 The Court did not elaborate on this sig-
nificant departure from its own precedent on general personal juris-
diction, which exclusively focused on in-forum activities.96
Apparently, this unprecedented requirement97 is necessary to deter-
mine where a corporation is at home. This implies that at home is a
concept larger than place of incorporation and principal place of busi-
ness. The majority, however, also opined that only minimal discovery
would be required to determine where a corporation is at home.98 This
second statement is difficult to reconcile with a requirement to evalu-
ate a corporation’s worldwide activities.
Perhaps the Court was suggesting that the at home standard is sy-
nonymous with principal place of business. Given that more than one
principal99 place of business would be an absurd result, the Court left
open the question of why the at home language was necessary.100 Of
course, the Court could be suggesting that at home is a broader con-
cept. This argument is supported by the Court’s statements that at
home is not limited to only place of incorporation and principal place
of business.101 However, the Court’s reference to “an exceptional
case,” like Perkins, suggests that this expansion would only include a
temporary principal place of business.102 At home is meant to be a
bright-line rule, but the Court went to great pains to allow an excep-
tion and then foreclosed any real possibility of utilizing that exception.
In addition to drawing us no nearer to understanding how at home is
distinct from principal place of business, the Court called into ques-
tion the very understanding of principal place of business itself.
Daimler did not object to the assertion of general personal jurisdic-
tion over MBUSA in California; although under Goodyear it is likely
that general personal jurisdiction could have been successfully chal-
lenged.103 Perhaps the challenge was not brought because California
94. Id. at 761.
95. Id. at 762 n.20.
96. Id. at 767 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment).
97. Id. at 764.
98. Id. at 762 n.20 (majority opinion).
99. Principal, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (5th pocket ed. 2016) (as an adjective:
chief; primary; most important).
100. Blanchard, supra note 77, at 883 (“the phrase ‘principal place of business’ [for
determining subject matter jurisdiction] refers to the place where the corporation’s
high level officers direct, control, and coordinate the corporation’s activities”).
101. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 762 n.19 (allowing that an exceptional case, like Perkins,
could allow a finding of at home beyond place of incorporation and principal place of
business).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 758.
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was viewed as convenient or because of uncertainty about the impre-
cise Goodyear language. There was also a strong argument for a fo-
rum non conveniens dismissal because none of the parties were from
California, none of the actions giving rise to the claim occurred there,
none of the evidence or witnesses were there, and California’s interest
in adjudicating a claim between a German company and Argentinian
citizens was tenuous at best and would add nothing to the American
body of law.104
However, under the at home standard, if the Daimler plaintiffs had
been residents of California injured in Argentina, the outcome would
be the same despite the significant change in factors. Additionally,
based on the Court’s statements regarding agency theory and piercing
the corporate veil, it is highly likely those Californians could not bring
suit anywhere in the United States.105 The Court did not need to in-
vent a new, narrower construction of general personal jurisdiction be-
cause the facts of Daimler would fail to establish personal jurisdiction
in California even under the broader International Shoe reasonable-
ness standard.106 This is similar to both Helicopteros and Goodyear,
where the facts supported only the thinnest, attenuated connection
between the defendant and the forum.107
In 2017, the Court affirmed its at home due process constraint on
general personal jurisdiction as applicable in all situations involving an
out-of-state corporation defendant in BNSF Railway Co. v. Tyrrell.108
As Perkins, Helicopteros, Goodyear, and Daimler all involved defend-
ants incorporated outside the United States,109 BNSF is the first Su-
preme Court decision to involve a domestic corporation. In addition,
the alleged harm suffered in those previous cases also occurred
104. Forum non conveniens factors include access to evidence and witnesses, the
burden on the defendant, the forum’s interest in adjudicating the claim, and the in-
convenience to the plaintiff of refiling the claim in another forum. Emily J. Derr,
Note, Striking a Better Public-Private Balance in Forum Non Conveniens, 93 CORNELL
L. REV. 819, 825 (2008).
105. Allowing the exercise of general personal jurisdiction over foreign corpora-
tions “whenever they have an in-state subsidiary or affiliate . . . would sweep beyond
even the ‘sprawling view of general jurisdiction’ [the Court] rejected in Goodyear.”
Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 760 (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v.
Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 929 (2011)).
106. Id. at 764 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment).
107. Helicol’s contacts included a contract negotiation meeting, accepting checks
drawn on a Texas bank, purchases from a Texas company, and training related to
those purchases. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 409 (1984).
Goodyear’s contacts included a small quantity of products reaching North Carolina
through “the stream of commerce.” Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v.
Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 920 (2011).
108. 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1558-59 (2017).
109. The Perkins defendant was incorporated in the Philippines. Perkins v. Benguet
Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 439 (1952). The Helicopteros defendant was incor-
porated in Colombia. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 409. The Goodyear defendants were
incorporated in Turkey, France, and Luxembourg. Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 918. The
Daimler defendant was incorporated in Germany. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 750-51.
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outside the United States, a further contrast with BNSF.110 The Court
reiterated that determining general personal jurisdiction requires eval-
uating all of a corporation’s activities, both within and outside of the
forum state.111 However, the Court also stated that “in-state busi-
ness . . . does not suffice to permit the assertion of general [personal]
jurisdiction over claims . . . that are unrelated to any activity occurring
in” the forum state.112 Arguably, the Court stated that relative activi-
ties are a factor in determining where a corporation is at home but
that the in-forum activities cannot support the exercise of general per-
sonal jurisdiction. Other than a vague reference to Perkins,113 the
Court gave no guidance on how comparative activity level relates to
being at home. As Justice Sotomayor eloquently pointed out in her
dissent, the so-called comparative activities test seems to serve no
purpose.114
BNSF involved the claims of two plaintiffs alleging injuries related
to employment with defendant BNSF.115 The plaintiff filed the claim
in a Montana state court, but the plaintiffs did not live or work for
BNSF in Montana.116 BNSF maintained operations in Montana but
was incorporated in Delaware and had its principal place of business
in Texas.117 Because the claims did not arise from activities in Mon-
tana, specific personal jurisdiction was not possible.118 The Montana
courts could only assert general personal jurisdiction over BNSF.119
The Montana Supreme Court held that Daimler did not control be-
cause that case did not involve the Federal Employers’ Liability Act
or a railroad defendant.120 The Supreme Court rejected the Montana
Supreme Court’s distinction and unequivocally held that Daimler ap-
plies to all “assertions of general [personal] jurisdiction over nonresi-
dent defendants,” regardless of the type of claim or defendant
entity.121 Evaluating BNSF’s activities within Montana in comparison
to their total operations, the Court found that the activities in Mon-
110. The Perkins plaintiff asserted claims related to stock in the defendant corpora-
tion. Perkins, 342 U.S. at 439. The Helicopteros plaintiffs asserted claims related to a
helicopter crash in Peru. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 410. The Goodyear plaintiffs as-
serted claims related to a bus accident in France. Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 918. The
Daimler plaintiffs asserted claims related to human rights violations in Argentina.
Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 751.
111. BNSF, 137 S. Ct. at 1559.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1558 (“Because Ohio then became ‘the center of the corporation’s war-
time activities,’ suit was proper there.”).
114. Id. at 1561 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
115. Id. at 1554 (majority opinion).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1558.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1558–59.
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tana were insufficient to establish the company as at home in
Montana.122
III. THE IMPACT OF THE AT HOME STANDARD
A. Restricting General Personal Jurisdiction Fora
The holdings in Goodyear, Daimler, and BNSF will likely dramati-
cally reduce the number of fora where a corporation may be required
to defend itself for injuries unrelated to the forum. Specifically, the
Supreme Court stated that allowing “the exercise of general [per-
sonal] jurisdiction in every State in which a corporation ‘engages in a
substantial, continuous, and systematic course of business[ ]’” would
be “unacceptably grasping.”123 Additionally, the invention of a com-
parative contacts test in Daimler, with no guidance on what weight
that test holds, virtually guarantees that general personal jurisdiction
will fail outside of the place of incorporation or principal place of
business.124
The Supreme Court articulated a “reasonableness” test in World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson for assertions of specific personal
jurisdiction (when the claim is related to the contacts).125 For defend-
ants, this test protects their due process rights to avoid being called to
defend themselves in distant, inconvenient fora.126 Balanced against
the defendant’s due process rights are several factors, including “the
plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief.”127
However, the Court also stated that regardless of the reasonableness
factors, due process would not allow a state to assert personal jurisdic-
tion against a “corporate defendant with which the state has no con-
tacts, ties, or relations.”128 The Goodyear, Daimler, and BNSF
holdings preclude any application of reasonableness in general per-
sonal jurisdiction analysis, making it “virtually inconceivable” that
multistate or multinational corporations would ever be subject to gen-
eral personal jurisdiction outside the place of incorporation or princi-
pal place of business.129
In Pennoyer, the Court presciently understood the personal jurisdic-
tion problems posed by business entities. The Court stated that states
may require partnerships and associations “to appoint an agent or
122. Id. at 1554, 1559.
123. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 761 (2014).
124. BNSF, 137 S. Ct. at 1561 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
125. 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 294. The defendants had virtually no contacts with the forum state be-
yond the foreseeability that their cars could be driven to other states. Id. at 295.
129. BNSF, 137 S. Ct. at 1560 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
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representative in the State to receive service of process.”130 The Court
also stated that States may prescribe how corporations may be held
accountable without “personal service upon their officers or mem-
bers.”131 The Court recognized that a State and its citizens had a nec-
essary interest in investigating conduct and, importantly, enforcing
obligations.132
The Court recognized in Pennoyer that restricting personal jurisdic-
tion could have the effect of denying certain plaintiffs the right to re-
dress.133 Although the Court spoke of a State’s ability to determine
“the civil status and capacities of all its inhabitants,” and used the ex-
ample of divorce, the Court understood that a restrictive rule created
the possibility of denying access to court.134 The Court specifically ex-
empted its holding from these “civil status” proceedings to avoid the
possibility that “the injured citizen would be without redress.”135
B. Restricting Corporations
The Supreme Court has established that, for purposes of due pro-
cess, a corporation is a person.136 However, the at home standard cre-
ates a significant disparity between individual and corporate
defendants: the ability to be “present” in fora beyond the home state.
A person’s “presence” is based on physical location, creating opportu-
nities for states to exercise general personal jurisdiction based on
physical presence.137 With corporations, the concept of forum contacts
serves as a form of substitute for physical presence.138 However, under
the at home standard a corporation’s activities in a state other than the
place of incorporation or principal place of business, no matter their
degree, will not establish the corporation’s presence in that state. A
person is subject to general personal jurisdiction wherever he may be
found, but a corporation is subject to general personal jurisdiction
only where it is at home.
Some corporations operate extensively in many states, or even in all
states.139 In fact, for some corporations, extensive operations in a wide
130. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 735 (1878).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 734–35.
135. Id. at 735.
136. E.g., Charlotte, C. & A. R.R. v. Gibbes, 142 U.S. 386, 391 (1892).
137. See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 619 (1990) (plurality opinion)
(holding that assertions of personal jurisdiction based on in-state service of process
are consistent with due process). The Court unanimously agreed that personal juris-
diction based on in-state service of process was valid, but differed on the justification
for that holding. Cody J. Jacobs, If Corporations Are People, Why Can’t They Play
Tag?, 46 N.M. L. REV. 1, 8 (2016).
138. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316–17 (1945).
139. WALMART, 2017 ANNUAL REPORT 63 (2017) (showing that Walmart operates
multiple retail outlets in all fifty states).
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geographic area are an integral part of their business plan.140 For ex-
ample, Walmart’s corporate objectives include dominating the compe-
tition and undercutting prices through maximizing economies of
scale.141 In addition, Walmart is the largest private employer in
twenty-two states.142 These extensive activities come with concomitant
obligations, which is the foundation of specific personal jurisdiction.143
As such, these multi-state corporations may be subject to suit in any
state where their contacts result in claims arising from those con-
tacts.144 Under the jurisprudence that developed between Interna-
tional Shoe and Goodyear, a corporation’s extensive activities could
also subject it to suit for claims not arising from those contacts. As
such, a corporation like Walmart could reasonably expect to defend
itself in a jurisdiction for specific claims arising from activities in that
jurisdiction and from non-specific claims because of the extent of their
continuous and systematic activities in that jurisdiction.
In contrast, under Goodyear, Daimler, and BNSF, Walmart is not
subject to general personal jurisdiction anywhere other than Delaware
and Arkansas.145 To illustrate the impact of this disparity, let us con-
sider the Texas mother injured in a Walmart store in Alaska. She may
bring a claim against Walmart in the state where her injury occurred,
Alaska, under specific personal jurisdiction. However, she cannot
bring the claim in Texas, a state where Walmart has 585 retail outlets
and more than 170,000 employees, because the injury did not occur in
Texas. Because the injury occurred in Alaska, the at home standard
would protect Walmart from defending itself in Texas courts, even if
she cannot realistically bring suit in Alaska and even if both parties
may prefer to adjudicate the claim in Texas rather than Alaska.
Similarly, the father from Illinois would face the same situation. Al-
though Six Flags operates a theme park in Illinois,146 under the at
home standard it is only subject to general personal jurisdiction in
Delaware and Texas.147 If the son’s injury occurred at the Six Flags
140. Id. at 4 (“Walmart stores are located within 10 miles of approximately 90 per-
cent of the U.S. population.”).
141. Id. at 7.
142. Evan Comen & Michael B. Sauter, The Largest Employer in Every State, 24/7
WALL ST. (Mar. 17, 2017, 6:00 AM), http://247wallst.com/special-report/2017/03/17/
largest-employer-in-every-state/ [https://perma.cc/G2S4-52KK].
143. Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 319.
144. Id. at 314.
145. According to Walmart’s Form 10-K filing with the Securities and Exchange
Commission, it is incorporated in Delaware and has its headquarters in Arkan-
sas. U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/
104169/000119312511083157/d10k.htm [https://perma.cc/96B3-25QA] (last visited Oct.
22, 2018).
146. SIX FLAGS ENTM’T CORP., 2017 ANNUAL REPORT 2 (2017) (showing that Six
Flags operates a theme park in Gurnee, Illinois).
147. According to Six Flags Entertainment Corporation’s Form 10-K filing with the
Securities and Exchange Commission, it is incorporated in Delaware and has its head-
quarters in Texas. U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, https://www.sec.gov/Arch
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near their home, the suit could be brought in Illinois under specific
personal jurisdiction. But because the injury occurred while the family
was on vacation, the claim may only be brought in California, Dela-
ware, or Texas.
The impact of the at home standard is that corporations who would
have been subject to both specific and general personal jurisdiction in
certain fora under the nearly seventy years of jurisprudence following
International Shoe are now suddenly protected from general personal
jurisdiction in those fora. In all states outside the state of incorpora-
tion and principal place of business, the corporation’s forum activities
could meet the International Shoe standard for specific personal juris-
diction but could not meet the at home standard for general personal
jurisdiction. These corporations can still be sued in any jurisdiction
where they have activities. The difference is that they can be sued in
those jurisdictions by fewer plaintiffs.
In essence, the at home standard means that a plaintiff who is in-
jured outside her home state cannot sue in her home state unless the
defendant is incorporated or has its principal place of business in her
home state. Although couched in terms of protecting defendants’ due
process rights from infringement, including inconvenience, the stan-
dard assumes it is always more convenient to defend a suit at home.
As there are many potential factors influencing a defendant’s conve-
nience, the standard does not account for the defendant’s actual con-
venience, whether that be positive, negative, or neutral.
C. Restricting Claims
In his dissent in World-Wide Volkswagen, Justice Brennan recog-
nized that a plaintiff who is “forced to travel to a distant state” to seek
redress could “be entirely unable to bring the cause of action.”148 By
reducing the number of fora where a corporate defendant can be
sued, the at home standard confirms this prediction in several
circumstances.
One example occurs when the amount in controversy is less than
the cost of traveling to a distant forum to obtain remedy. Although
the value constraint exists in all claims, an important consideration in
the plaintiff’s choice of forum will include the relative costs of pursu-
ing a claim in those fora. Travel costs may include transportation and
lodging, lost work time, and the cost of being separated from family
and social supports. In addition, legal fees may increase dramatically,
especially if additional attorneys are required for appearances in a dis-
tant forum. The at home standard effectively increases the cost of ob-
ives/edgar/data/701374/000070137416000189/form10-k_123115.htm [https://perma.cc/5
UDD-J2U8] (last visited Oct. 22, 2018).
148. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 302–03 (1980)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
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taining a remedy, thereby increasing the minimum recovery that will
be needed to make pursuit of the claim worthwhile.
A second example occurs when travel is not possible for the plain-
tiff. Disability, family or work obligations, or probation and parole can
create barriers for plaintiffs to travel to distant fora. While this has
always been true, the at home standard reduces the available fora and
exacerbates the impact of travel barriers. For example, the plaintiffs in
World-Wide Volkswagen suffered severe injuries, likely preventing
them from brining suit where the defendant was at home.149 Whether
to a distant forum where a party was injured or a distant forum where
the responsible party is “at home,” the Supreme Court’s suggestion
that plaintiffs have “recourse to at least one clear and certain fo-
rum”150 ignores the reality that many people are simply unable to
travel freely.151
Likewise, the risk of injury while traveling is another litigation bar-
rier. Travel for vacation, work, government service, or for visits to
friends and family is increasingly commonplace. If a plaintiff is injured
while traveling, specific personal jurisdiction would exist at the desti-
nation and general personal jurisdiction will exist only at the defen-
dant’s home. If neither forum is accessible, a plaintiff is left without
any forum to bring suit. For small corporations without any contacts
with the plaintiff’s home state, this rule seems justified. But for large,
multistate and multinational corporations with significant activities in
the plaintiff’s home state, the justification is less convincing.
Finally, another example occurs when the claim involves a corpora-
tion with its place of incorporation and principal place of business
outside the United States. Although there may be significant activities
within the United States, no state would meet the at home standard,
thereby rendering these corporations immune from suit and denying
injured plaintiffs any United States forum in which to seek redress.152
Scholars have suggested that the Supreme Court may have “a reluc-
tance to draw foreign disputes into United States courts,” which
would explain the transnational elements of Goodyear, Helicopteros,
and Daimler.153 However, other methods exist to achieve that
purpose.154
149. Id. at 288 (majority opinion).
150. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 760 (2014).
151. The reasonableness standard was not implicated by the specific facts of World-
Wide Volkswagen because there were no significant contacts between the defendant
and the forum. The Author argues that if there were significant contacts in a similar
scenario, the “at home” standard would deny the plaintiffs the ability to bring their
claim. See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. 286.
152. The Author recognizes that if the injury occurred in the United States, the
defendant may be subject to specific personal jurisdiction in the forum where the
injury occurred.
153. Robertson & Rhodes, supra note 36, at 786.
154. If the injury occurred outside the United States, even if general personal juris-
diction were allowed, the defendant could move for a dismissal under the doctrine of
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWR\5-3\TWR305.txt unknown Seq: 19 15-APR-19 14:26
2019] THE FORGOTTEN PROPERTY RIGHT 519
D. Retrospective: Applying the At Home Standard
to Pre-Goodyear Cases
Two cases applying Florida law, one in the Florida Appellate Court
and one in the Eleventh Circuit, illustrate situations where plaintiffs
successfully asserted general personal jurisdiction over non-resident
corporate defendants under the International Shoe standard, but
would be unlikely to succeed today.155 Chronologically, both cases
were decided between Helicopteros (1984) and Goodyear (2011).
In Woods v. Nova Companies Belize Ltd., the Florida Appeals
Court held the exercise of general personal jurisdiction over the de-
fendant corporation was consistent with due process.156 Although the
defendant was incorporated and had its principal place of business in
Belize, the corporation had extensive contacts in Florida, which in-
cluded shipping the majority of its product to and through the state.157
Florida’s long-arm statute provided that substantial activity provides a
basis for personal jurisdiction regardless of in-state activity giving rise
to the claim.158 The court held that because the standard was high,
it also satisfied the “constitutional requirements of minimum
contacts.”159
Additionally, the plaintiff was a resident of Belize, and the cause of
action arose from an aircraft accident in Costa Rica.160 This scenario
mirrors Daimler, where both the parties and the events giving rise to
the claim were foreign to the chosen forum. In Woods, however, the
court only considered whether the defendant’s Florida activities suffi-
ciently established general personal jurisdiction, and then separately
analyzed the defendant’s motion to dismiss under forum non
conveniens.161
In Meier v. Sun International Hotels, Ltd., the Eleventh Circuit ex-
amined the exercise of general personal jurisdiction over a defendant
incorporated and having its principal place of business in the Baha-
mas.162 Like Daimler, Meier involved imputing a subsidiary’s activities
forum non conveniens. For a discussion of forum non conveniens, see Piper Aircraft
Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
155. The defendant’s forum contacts would probably not satisfy either Goodyear’s
“fairly regarded as at home” or Daimler’s “incorporation or principle place of busi-
ness” standard. See, e.g., Woods v. Nova Cos. Belize, 739 So. 2d 617, 621 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1999); Meier v. Sun Int’l Hotels, Ltd., 288 F.3d 1264, 1278 (11th Cir. 2002).
156. 739 So. 2d at 621.
157. Id. at 619.
158. Id. at 620.
159. Id. at 621.
160. Id. at 619.
161. Id. at 621. In a divided ruling, the court denied the motion for dismissal under
forum non conveniens because the plaintiff received a majority of his medical treat-
ment in Florida. Id. at 622–23. The court concluded that because “the majority of the
damage testimony and evidence would involve witnesses located in Florida,” Florida
was a reasonable forum. Id. at 622.
162. 288 F.3d 1264, 1268 (11th Cir. 2002).
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to the foreign parent corporation for the purpose of establishing sub-
stantial activity.163 The plaintiffs, residents of Utah, sustained injuries
while on the defendant’s property in the Bahamas.164
The plaintiffs successfully imputed the activities of the subsidiary to
the defendant corporation under the Florida long-arm statute when
that subsidiary was “merely an agent . . . without any semblance of
individual identity.”165 The Florida subsidiary’s activities included
handling the majority of the reservations at the parent company’s re-
sort, coordinating advertising, marketing, purchasing, accounting, and
collections activities.166 Under reasoning similar to Woods, the court
held that the subsidiary’s activities in Florida satisfied the continuous
and systematic contacts requirement of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.167 Like Woods, the court separated the analyses of general per-
sonal jurisdiction and forum non conveniens.168
In holding that the exercise of general personal jurisdiction was
consistent with due process, the court also addressed the “traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice” requirement of Interna-
tional Shoe.169 The plaintiffs had an annual family income of
$37,833.170 By contrast, the defendants operated multiple luxury re-
sorts and spent millions of dollars annually on advertising alone.171
The court rejected the defendant’s contention that the plaintiffs could
pursue their claim in the Bahamas as “clearly inapposite to obtaining
convenient and effective relief.”172
Perhaps Woods and Meier represent the extent of the reasonable-
ness standard that developed after International Shoe. Like Goodyear
and Daimler, these cases involve defendant corporations, and plain-
tiffs in the Woods case, that were based outside of the United States.
However, the at home standard applies to all scenarios involving de-
fendant corporations. Today, Mr. Woods and Mr. Meier would face
similar challenges to those that the mother from Texas and father
from Illinois face in obtaining a judicial remedy.
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE AT HOME STANDARD
“Only by providing that the social enforcement mechanism must
function strictly within [the bounds of due process] can we hope to
163. Id. at 1272.
164. Id. at 1276.
165. Id. at 1272.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 1274.
168. Id. at 1276. The court remanded on the forum non conveniens motion due to
insufficient evidence in the record. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
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maintain an ordered society that is also just.”173 The at home standard
results in a class of plaintiffs who are effectively denied access to the
courts. This access to the courts, or right to redress, has been estab-
lished as a fundamental property right subject to the protections of the
Constitution. It follows then that infringement of that right must com-
port with due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Otherwise, plaintiffs are denied property without due process of law.
A. The Fundamental Property Right to Redress
The right to redress has been considered a property right since the
time of Roman law.174 Property interests in intangible rights to future
possession existed in the English common law before the formation of
the United States.175 “[T]he term ‘chose in action’ includes all rights
which are enforceable by action.”176 The Supreme Court has sup-
ported chose in actions for nearly 150 years.177 The Supreme Court
has held that causes of action are a “species of property” under the
Due Process Clause.178 Simply put, a “right of action is property.”179
Fundamental rights “are most clearly present when the Constitution
provides specific textual recognition of their existence and impor-
tance.”180 Property rights are deemed fundamental under the “liber-
ties set forth in the Bill of Rights” and are subject to due process
protection.181 The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitu-
tion prohibit the government from depriving a person of their prop-
erty without due process.182
When a fundamental right has been infringed, the class size of af-
fected individuals is irrelevant to the due process analysis.183 One of
the foundational premises of our system of government is to protect
minority interests.184 In this situation, the class losing its right is likely
comprised of disadvantaged individuals, arguably those that need the
most protection. Any plaintiff, including corporations, may suffer
173. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 375 (1971).
174. GEORGE MOUSOURAKIS, ROMAN LAW & THE ORIGINS OF THE CIVIL LAW
TRADITION 113 (2015).
175. See W. S. Holdsworth, The History of the Treatment of Choses in Action by the
Common Law, 33 HARV. L. REV. 997, 1005 (1920) (citing Sir Thomas Palmer’s Case,
5 Co. Rep. 24b (1601)).
176. Id. at 997 (emphasis omitted).
177. See Bushnell v. Kennedy, 76 U.S. 387 (1869).
178. See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 428 (1982); Martinez v.
California, 444 U.S. 277, 281–82 (1980).
179. Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 120 N.E. 198, 201 (N.Y. 1918).
180. Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 790
(1986) (White, J., dissenting).
181. Id.
182. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
183. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) (holding that fundamental rights
may only be infringed on a showing of compelling interest and that the infringement
is narrowly tailored to serve that interest).
184. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWR\5-3\TWR305.txt unknown Seq: 22 15-APR-19 14:26
522 TEX. A&M J. PROP. L. [Vol. 5
under the at home standard.185 Plaintiffs with less means, however, are
more likely to suffer a complete bar to access.
Access to the courts is integral to exercising a chose in action.
Hence, “the Due Process Clauses protect civil litigants who seek re-
course in the courts, either as defendants hoping to protect their prop-
erty or as plaintiffs attempting to redress grievances.”186 As Justice
Cardozo explained, a “plaintiff owns something, and [the courts] help
him to get it.”187 Courts “do not close their doors unless help would
violate some fundamental principle of justice.”188
It is noteworthy that in Christopher v. Harbury, the Supreme Court
acknowledged that the Constitutional basis for the right of access to
courts is “unsettled.”189 The Court has “grounded the right of access
to courts” in the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, Privileges and Immunities Clause, and Petition Clause of the
First Amendment.190 This Comment assumes that the Due Process
Clauses are legitimate bases for the right of access to the courts.
B. The Requirements of Due Process
When a fundamental right is curtailed, courts employ various tests
to analyze permissibility in relation to due process.191 Each approach
attempts to answer a fundamental yet subjective question: Is there a
sufficient justification for infringing on individual rights?192 The Su-
preme Court performs a two-step analysis of due process violations:
first, a determination of whether the plaintiff was “deprived of a pro-
tected interest,” and second, “what process was his due.”193
The Supreme Court held that it was a deprivation of a protected
interest when a “procedural limitation on the claimant’s ability to as-
sert his rights” was unrelated to “a substantive element” of the under-
lying claim.194 “[T]he ‘property’ component of the Fifth Amendment’s
185. Robertson & Rhodes, supra note 36, at 784–85.
186. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 429 (1982).
187. Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 120 N.E. 198, 201 (N.Y. 1918).
188. Id. at 202.
189. 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002).
190. Id. at 415 n.12. See, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause); Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989) (Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause); Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987) (Equal
Protection Clause); Chambers v. Balt. & Ohio R.R., 207 U.S. 142 (1907) (Privileges
and Immunities Clause); Bill Johnson’s Rests., Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731 (1983)
(Petition Clause).
191. See Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 HARV. L.
REV. 1175, 1200 (1996).
192. See id. at 1234.
193. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 428 (1982). See also Mullane v.
Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950); Martinez v. California, 444 U.S.
277 (1980).
194. Logan, 455 U.S. at 433.
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Due Process Clause [imposes] ‘constitutional limitations upon the
power of courts, even in aid of their own valid processes, to dismiss an
action without affording a party the opportunity for a hearing on the
merits of his cause.’”195 Likewise, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause prevents States from taking actions equivalent to de-
nying claimants “a meaningful opportunity to be heard.”196
A “determination of the precise nature of the government function
involved” and the private interest affected by the government’s action
must be considered when deciding the procedures that due process
may require.197 By 1850, the Supreme Court recognized that “the
rights of all parties must be regarded.”198 In multiple holdings,199 the
Supreme Court emphasized that plaintiffs have a protected property
interest that cannot be deprived without “an opportunity to present
[their] claim of entitlement.”200 That opportunity “must be tailored”
to plaintiffs’ “capacities and circumstances.”201
In Boddie v. Connecticut, the Supreme Court confronted the ques-
tion of the plaintiff’s due process rights.202 The Court explained that a
due process analysis typically focused on defendants because they had
no other means of dispute resolution once they had been sued.203
Boddie involved the dissolution of marriage, which could only be ac-
complished through judicial action.204 The Court recognized that in
certain circumstances due process analysis must shift to include the
plaintiff.205 Plaintiff’s due process rights are particularly paramount
when “[r]esort to the judicial process” is involuntary because it is the
only means available to a plaintiff.206 The Court concluded that “the
right to a meaningful opportunity to be heard within the limits of
practicality[ ] must be protected” even against laws that may “jeop-
ardize it for particular individuals.”207
195. Id. at 429 (quoting Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958)) (em-
phasis omitted).
196. Id. at 429–30, n.5 (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 377 (1971)).
197. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263 (1970) (quoting Cafeteria & Rest. Work-
ers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961)).
198. Boswell’s Lessee v. Otis, 50 U.S. 336, 350 (1850).
199. See, e.g., Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950); Bell
v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971); Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Logan,
455 U.S. 422.
200. Logan, 455 U.S. at 434.
201. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 268–69.
202. 401 U.S. 371, 375 (1971).
203. Id. at 376.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 376-77. The Court emphasized it was not deciding that access to courts
was subject to due process protection in all circumstances. Id. at 382. In his concur-
rence, Justice Brennan questioned whether there was a Constitutional distinction be-
tween the state statute in question and “any other right arising under federal or state
law.” Id. at 387 (Brennan, J., concurring in part).
206. Id. at 376-77 (majority opinion).
207. Id. at 379-80.
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C. Strict Scrutiny of Restrictions on Fundamental Rights
To be consistent with due process, the restriction of a fundamental
right must derive from a compelling government interest and must be
narrowly constructed to meet that interest.208 The Supreme Court has
stated that “a government practice or statute which restricts funda-
mental rights or which contains suspect classifications is to be sub-
jected to strict scrutiny and can be justified only if it furthers a
compelling government purpose and, even then, only if no less restric-
tive alternative is available.”209
There are many ways to evaluate whether a government interest is
compelling.210 A textual link to the Constitution can support the find-
ing of a compelling interest.211 For example, the compelling interest in
a diverse student body was drawn from the First Amendment’s right
to academic freedom.212 Similarly, interests in combating race discrim-
ination were drawn from the Equal Protection Clause.213 However, a
constitutional link is not required. For example, the Court has found
that the government had a compelling interest in protecting children
from physical and psychological harm.214
Courts analyze several factors in determining whether a govern-
ment action is narrowly tailored—that is, whether it satisfies a com-
pelling interest through minimally restrictive means.215 First, the
infringement must be necessary to further the interest.216 If the goal
could be accomplished without infringing a right, then the infringe-
ment is unnecessary.217 Second, the court evaluates whether the action
is underinclusive.218 Although not dispositive, underinclusiveness can
suggest an impermissible motive or call into question the action’s abil-
ity to achieve the goal.219 For example, a statute that prohibits only
certain actors from the disclosure of crime victim identities is underin-
clusive.220 Third, the Supreme Court has held that overinclusive ac-
tions are not narrowly tailored.221 However, overinclusive actions may
fail narrow tailoring regardless of whether less restrictive alternatives
208. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
209. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 357 (1978) (Brennan, J., con-
curring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (internal quotes omitted).
210. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1321
(2007).
211. Id.
212. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311–13 (majority opinion).
213. Fallon, Jr., supra note 210, at 1321.
214. Id. at 1322.
215. Id. at 1326.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 1327.
219. Id.
220. See Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 540 (1989).
221. Fallon, Jr., supra note 210, at 1328.
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exist.222 For example, a statute that restricts television programming at
certain times because of possibly unintentional viewing is overinclu-
sive.223 Finally, balancing the interest and the infringement is inherent
in making a qualitative determination of narrow tailoring.224 In real-
ity, not all interests are equally compelling, just as not all infringe-
ments are equally harmful.225
D. Applying Strict Scrutiny to the At Home Standard
While it may seem counterintuitive to say that narrowing a rule
causes the rule to fail narrow tailoring, the at home standard can effec-
tively deprive plaintiffs of access to any redress. In due process terms,
general personal jurisdiction has always been concerned with defend-
ants.226 The government’s compelling interest is to protect defend-
ants.227 However, both parties have due process rights at stake.228 The
problem with the at home standard is that, in some circumstances, it
protects defendants to the detriment of plaintiffs and potentially vio-
lates the latter’s due process rights. In other words, a line has been
crossed which creates due process concerns for the plaintiff. Whereas
the compelling interest concerns the defendant, the infringement con-
cerns the plaintiff.
The Daimler Court gave several insights into its justification for
adopting a narrower application of general personal jurisdiction. First,
the plaintiffs asserted that a California court could properly exercise
general personal jurisdiction over Daimler in a case involving a Polish
citizen injured in Poland.229 The Court found this exercise of general
personal jurisdiction “exorbitant” and inconsistent with due pro-
cess.230 Second, the Court found that allowing “the exercise of general
[personal] jurisdiction in every State in which a corporation engages in
a substantial, continuous, and systematic course of business” was
“unacceptably grasping.”231 The Court explained that such a standard
for general personal jurisdiction “would scarcely permit out-of-state
defendants ‘to structure their primary conduct with some minimum
assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render them liable
to suit.’”232
222. Id.
223. See United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 814 (2000).
224. See Fallon, Jr., supra note 210, at 1330.
225. Id. at 1331.
226. Rees, supra note 10, at 406.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 751 (2014).
230. Id.
231. Id. at 761 (internal quotation marks omitted).
232. Id. at 761–62 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472
(1985)).
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWR\5-3\TWR305.txt unknown Seq: 26 15-APR-19 14:26
526 TEX. A&M J. PROP. L. [Vol. 5
This reasoning suggests that the Court was concerned with the
scope and unpredictability of a broad definition of general personal
jurisdiction. Consistent with traditional personal jurisdiction analysis,
these arguments pertain to the defendant’s interests, wholly ignoring
the plaintiff’s interests. This defendant-oriented focus is unsurprising
given that courts routinely and appropriately ignore the role of the
plaintiff’s rights in jurisdictional analysis in most circumstances.233
However, applying the narrow-tailoring factors to the at home stan-
dard reveals significant problems for a certain category of plaintiffs.
First, the at home standard is unnecessary because a well-functioning
rule already existed. Prior to Goodyear, the Supreme Court provided
little guidance in applying general personal jurisdiction.234 However,
the framework developed by the lower courts was largely
predictable.235
Second, from the plaintiff’s perspective, the at home standard is
overinclusive because corporations can be both defendants and plain-
tiffs. A small corporation with limited assets and operations may en-
counter the same preclusion effect as an individual when that
corporation is the plaintiff. Additionally, larger corporations have
found it difficult to defend intellectual property rights against foreign
infringement.236 While the at home standard is meant to protect cor-
porations in defending suits, it may also restrict their ability to file
suits.
Finally, the at home standard is not aligned with the objective be-
cause it fails to achieve the goal of predictability in some circum-
stances. Large corporations may maintain more than one site with
characteristics of a principal place of business, calling into question
the ability to cleanly determine where the corporation is at home. Be-
cause the plaintiff must choose where to file suit, the at home standard
provides little certainty in these situations about which of several pos-
sibilities is the principal place of business.
For example, Amazon is currently planning a second corporate
headquarters, which will be “a full equal” to its existing headquar-
ters.237 Depending on the division of corporate functions, Amazon
could find it equally inconvenient to litigate where the “other” head-
quarters is compared to the plaintiff’s home forum. In addition, indi-
vidual plaintiffs will likely file suit in both locations, eroding the
predictability of the at home standard. Ultimately, if principal place of
233. Rees, supra note 10, at 412. Focusing on defendants is appropriate because
they “have a due process liberty interest shielding them from overreaching fora.” Id.
at 406.
234. Robertson & Rhodes, supra note 36, at 779.
235. Id. at 779–80.
236. Id. at 784–85. See, e.g., Gucci Am., Inc. v. Bank of China, 768 F.3d 122 (2d Cir.
2014); Acorda Therapeutics, Inc. v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., 817 F.3d 755 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
237. AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/b?node=17044620011 [https://perma.cc/76
BB-YTYG] (last visited Oct. 12, 2018).
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business as a legal term of art is singular,238 courts may be compelled
to reach the strange conclusion that the corporation is not at home
where it has its headquarters.
“If a plaintiff can show that his chosen forum State has a sufficient
interest in the litigation (or sufficient contacts with the defendant),
then the defendant who cannot show some real injury to a constitu-
tionally protected interest should have no constitutional excuse not to
appear.”239 However, “[t]he defendant has no constitutional entitle-
ment to the best forum or, for that matter, to any particular forum.”240
Furthermore, in light of the significant societal changes since Pen-
noyer, “constitutional concepts of fairness no longer require the ex-
treme concern for defendants that was once necessary.”241 Indeed,
granting the defendant “complete control of the geographical stretch
of his amenability to [file] suit”242 seems to be the unacceptably grasp-
ing position.
V. CONCLUSION
Where practical, the Supreme Court prefers bright-line rules that
minimize legislation and encourage people to interact.243 The Court
has even held that its preference for bright-line rules will allow some
infringement of rights in pursuit of the goal of certainty.244 However,
its attempt to apply a bright-line standard to exercises of general per-
sonal jurisdiction has not achieved this objective. Further, the stan-
dard it created impermissibly infringes on a plaintiff’s due process
rights.
The Supreme Court’s approach to general personal jurisdiction
seems to be disconnected from both its own precedent and the reali-
ties of a changing society. In Daimler, the Court opined that Interna-
tional Shoe does not suggest that some amount of activity in a forum
gives that forum authority over a larger amount of activity not con-
nected to that forum.245 However, that seems to be exactly what Inter-
national Shoe was suggesting—that activities within a state can justify
jurisdiction in that state over wholly unrelated activities.246 The
238. It has been suggested that the Supreme Court’s use of the legal term of art
“principal place of business” should be defined in alignment with Hertz Corp. v.
Friend. 559 U.S. 77 (2010). In Hertz, the Court defined principal place of business for
subject matter jurisdiction purposes as “the one place from which ‘the corporation’s
high level officers direct, control, and coordinate the corporation’s activities,’” re-
ferred to as the nerve center test. See Blanchard, supra note 77, at 887–88.
239. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 312 (1980) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting).
240. Id. at 301.
241. Id. at 309.
242. Id. at 311.
243. Robertson & Rhodes, supra note 36, at 788.
244. See id.
245. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 762 n.20 (2014).
246. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318–19 (1945).
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Daimler footnote arguably suggests that there is no such thing as gen-
eral personal jurisdiction. This argument is possibly supported by the
Court’s statement that “we have declined to stretch general [personal]
jurisdiction beyond limits traditionally recognized,”247 suggesting the
Court views Pennoyer’s territorial approach is controlling law for gen-
eral personal jurisdiction.
The easily applied but overly restrictive rule of Pennoyer did not
work. The flexible focus on reasonableness that developed after Inter-
national Shoe and worked for more than seventy years was much bet-
ter suited to the rapidly changing nature of our society. The move
back to Pennoyer-like rules in Goodyear, Daimler, and BNSF affords
little or no real benefit to corporations, but for some plaintiffs is a
fatal burden. The at home standard is unnecessary and does not sur-
vive strict scrutiny analysis. The Supreme Court’s unexplained and un-
supported harkening back to Pennoyer created uncertainty that has
spawned more than 300 law review articles in three years. One hun-
dred years ago, Justice Cardozo warned that “[i]t cannot be that pub-
lic policy forbids our courts to help [plaintiffs] in collecting what
belongs to them. . . . We shall not make things better by sending them
to another state, . . . where suit may be impossible.”248 The at home
standard does just that.
247. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 757–58.
248. Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 120 N.E. 198, 202 (N.Y. 1918).
